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Remedies, Enforcement and Territoriality 
Eric J. Schwartz* 
Thank you to everyone at the Kernochan Center for inviting me to participate 
and for organizing this symposium.  Like Sam Ricketson, I knew and was very 
fortunate to work with Jack Kernochan, and I am a better copyright lawyer because 
of him.  As with all practicing attorneys, I begin with this caveat:  the views I am 
expressing today are my own and should not be associated with or attributed to any 
of my clients.  
What I was asked to speak about on this panel are the challenges confronting 
authors, producers, and publishers on copyright enforcement, as well as what the 
treaties require and permit regarding enforcement.  I will focus on five key points. 
The first point is what the treaties require and permit regarding enforcement.  As 
has been pointed out by those much more expert than I (Jane and Sam, in their 
book), the Berne Convention’s treatment of enforcement is pretty thin.  There are 
references in Berne’s Article 13 (for recordings) and Article 16 (for works) with 
regard to the seizure of infringing copies, including foreign copies.1  But there is 
nothing else in Berne specific to enforcement remedies.  The WTO TRIPS 
agreement in Articles 41 through 61 is obviously much more robust on 
enforcement, covering a wide range of civil, administrative and criminal remedies 
that member countries must implement into their legal regimes.2 
 
 * Eric J. Schwartz, a partner at Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, has over twenty-five years 
of experience as a copyright attorney providing counseling on U.S. and foreign copyright laws.  Prior to 
his work in private practice, Mr. Schwartz worked as a senior attorney, and in 1994 as Acting General 
Counsel, at the U.S. Copyright Office.  At the Copyright Office (1988-1994), he helped to negotiate 
over a dozen bilateral copyright trade agreements, and served on U.S. government delegations 
negotiating the NAFTA, WTO, TRIPs, and other multi-lateral trade agreements and copyright treaties.  
Mr. Schwartz received his B.A. from Johns Hopkins University, his J.D. from American University, 
Washington College of Law, and, is an adjunct professor of copyright law at Georgetown University 
Law Center and at American University, Washington College of Law.  He is the author (since 1999) of 
the U.S. copyright law chapter in the treatise Geller, Nimmer & Bently, International Copyright Law 
and Practice.  These remarks are adapted from the transcript of a talk that was given on October 6, 2017, 
at the Kernochan Center Annual Symposium at Columbia Law School. 
 1.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised 
July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 
https://perma.cc/A8MA-9CGV. 
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 41-61, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
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Then, of course, there are the WIPO digital treaties, which picked up—
verbatim—some of the language incorporated in Article 41 of TRIPS, requiring 
member countries of the WCT or WPPT to have in their legal regimes “effective 
action” including “expeditious remedies”, and that these must “constitute a 
deterrent.”3  So, there is not a lot of specificity in the digital treaties of what these 
remedies look like, and more to the point, rights holders would be very lucky that 
whatever they are, they would exist in all of these treaty countries because there are 
no dispute mechanisms to force implementation of remedies in the digital treaties.  
My first point though is about the mandated treaty remedies and what is 
effective.  Let me begin with something that has not been discussed much today, 
which is criminal enforcement.  In a lot of marketplaces in many countries, the 
significant harm to authors and producers is piracy undertaken by organized crime 
syndicates making very large sums of money.  This is a rough-and-tumble world.  
In the years that I have done this work, I have had one colleague killed by these 
groups and several others who have been targeted and shot at for trying to stop 
piracy, and the perpetrators were, in most of these instances, corrupted government 
officials engaged in criminal syndicates.  You would no more expect a rights holder 
in the United States to go after an organized crime syndicate with civil remedies 
than you would in any other country.  That is why government intervention in the 
form of criminal enforcement is an essential part of effective enforcement.  
Whether it is the old hard copy piracy world or the digital piracy world, there is no 
difference in what is effective and that is targeting operators and owners of the 
large pirate sources; whether they are BitTorrent or streaming sites or pay-per-
download sites that still exist in many counties and many marketplaces, these are 
what needs to be the focus of criminal enforcement.  TRIPS Article 61 requires 
WTO member countries to have criminal remedies for copyright piracy “on a 
commercial scale” and these types of operators and organized crime syndicate 
operations are self-defining as on a commercial scale.  The penalties must also 
include imprisonment and fines that provide a deterrent not just a cost of doing 
business penalty.4 
The real problem of course in many countries is, even if these remedies exist on 
paper, they do not exist in reality because of a lack of government will-power or 
resources—for example, in poor countries that do not have any enforcement 
resources so IP enforcement is certainly not a priority.  Further, in many countries 
where some of my clients are in the marketplace—for example, in Eastern and 
Central Europe—there is wide-spread corruption, so enforcement authorities are 
just not going to engage in effective enforcement, and sometimes it is the 
government itself that is part and parcel at the center of the large-scale commercial 
piracy activities. 
 
© 2018 Schwartz.  This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction, provided the original 
author and source are credited. 
 3. Id. at art. 41. 
 4.  Id. at art. 61. 
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My second key point, as I move from the very bleak to the little less bleak in the 
options for rights holders to protect their rights, is civil enforcement.  TRIPS 
Article 41, pertaining to civil remedies, includes the identical language requiring 
such remedies to be “effective, expeditious and deterrent.”5  Articles 42 through 50 
talk about the range of required civil and administrative remedies that WTO 
member countries must incorporate into their national laws, civil codes, customs 
codes, and administrative codes.6  But what might have been effective in the hard 
copy, physical piracy world does not necessarily translate into an effective remedy 
for the digital world.  For example, the customs provisions in Articles 51 through 
60 may be effective for trademark protection, but not so much for copyright and 
especially digital copyright material.7 
Including the proper civil and administrative remedies into national laws does 
not, of course by itself, result in any improvements.  It is not late-breaking news to 
tell you how slow, ineffective, and burdensome civil remedies can be, especially 
against large-scale piratical enterprises.  Plus, civil enforcement, puts the burden of 
enforcement solely on rights holders, requiring them to engage in enforcement in 
foreign countries, which is costly and not often successful.  Plus, the treaties do not 
require, and in fact are silent, on any third-party liability which is the more 
effective way to engage in civil enforcement.  One part of civil enforcement is 
notice and takedown which was never intended to be an enforcement mechanism 
per se, just a tool in the toolkit with other effective remedies, but one that helps to 
promote cooperation between rights holders and the platforms.  Even that has not 
always worked out as planned.  That is because repeat infringer policies, a 
prerequisite to the so-called safe harbors from liability, are often ineffective.  Also, 
many countries have no third party liability at all or, as in the United States (as the 
result of litigation) have created a high hurdle for liability whether in the form of 
vicarious or contributory liability (or, after the Grokster case8) for inducement 
liability. 
There are also administrative remedies, which as an alternative civil remedies 
are usually a lot less expensive than other remedies.  But, again, a lot of these 
administrative remedies work better in a physical world than in the digital world.  
For example, revoking a vendor’s license to sell materials on a street corner when 
found to have infringing materials works better in the physical copy world, as does 
using the tax authorities in some instances.  In fact, civil actions are generally more 
effective against unauthorized software end-users, which generally means that an 
unlicensed end-user becomes a licensed user.  But this remedy does not translate as 
well for other copyrighted materials such as books, film, music and video games.  
What would put more vigor into civil enforcement actions, if required by treaties or 
agreements, would be compensatory and statutory damages. 
My third point—after criminal remedies and civil and administrative remedies—
is to look to cooperative and voluntary actions between rights holders and 
 
 5.  Id. at art. 41. 
 6.  Id. at arts. 42-50. 
 7.  Id. at arts. 51-60. 
 8.  MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).  
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disseminators and users.  There is not a lot I can say about these in my remaining 
three minutes on this panel, other than to say that to some degree they do work.  
For example, the conversations that began years ago among rights holders and the 
ISPs, platforms, advertisers and financial supporters of online sites and services 
have certainly yielded some positive results and improvements for rights holders’ 
protection of works online.  These are not treaty required actions, nor are they even 
mentioned in the treaties, so not engaging in cooperative and voluntary actions 
obviously does not invoke treaty compliance problems. 
There are also technological protections and commercial factors that have 
worked.  The most obvious of these is technical protection measures (“TPMs”).  
TPMs have allowed rights holders to deliver to consumers more works and 
recordings in more formats and at various price ranges (including for free) than at 
any time in history.  So, this is an economic form of voluntary “self-help”—to 
quote Giuseppe Mazziotti—a self-help remedy.  And it really works effectively. 
Point four is special provisions and problems regarding enforcement, which are 
worth noting in my last few thoughts here.  The first of these is camcording 
(copying films without authorization in theaters and making copies and uploading 
them online).  Camcording is not mentioned in any of the copyright treaties, but has 
been the subject of conversation in recent trade agreements.  For example, it will 
hopefully get incorporated into NAFTA 2.0.  Why?  Because Mexico is the largest 
supplier of unauthorized films that are uploaded on the Internet in the world—a 
total of eighty-five major motion pictures (owned by the American studios) were 
camcorded in Mexico last year.  And Mexico does not have any provisions to 
effectively address camcording.9  Mexico does have a related and very weak 
provision, but I do not have time today to describe it; suffice to say, it does not 
work. 
The second special provision would be adding language in national laws to 
penalize aiding and abetting as a criminal matter; this would certainly be an 
improved enforcement tool.  Such a provision is not unprecedented:  it is included 
in the CETA, the Canadian and European Union Trade Agreement, and is 
something that was included in the negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (the TPP 
agreement) before the U.S. withdrew from the TPP.10 
A third special provision is one Giuseppe Mazziotti has already mentioned:  
remedies directed at predatory foreign websites.  Special remedies are needed 
against these commercial infringing sites from outside the host countries because 
the host countries are not taking action.  Actions can include either geo-blocking or 
web-blocking in countries that do want to engage in enforcement.  There are now 
over—I think—twenty countries that have provisions in their laws that permit web-
blocking.  The United States is not one of them, absent a long-drawn court 
proceeding.  Still another tool in that vein is to undertake domain name seizures. 
 
 9. Michael White, Hollywood:  Organized Crime Goes to the Movies, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 7, 
2011, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/6MKP-E6N2. 
 10.  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, 
and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, Sept. 14, 2016, 2016/0206 (NLE). 
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A fourth special provision is one that concerns the motion picture, television and 
live sports industries.  These are the so-called Kodi boxes which are also 
sometimes referred to as illicit streaming devices (“ISDs”).  These devices are legal 
as naked devices, but are altered from a legal box to an illegal one to allow a buyer 
to get a live streaming of content using apps or on-demand services.  These devices 
are made and sold in China, often for export, and are distributed in India, Mexico 
and many other countries.  The devices are sold either pre-loaded with apps that 
circumvent technologies to allow you to get into paid, subscriber content, whether 
it’s Netflix, or cable systems, or whatever, or they are sold “clean” and the 
circumvention apps are available for free on the Internet.  This is a fast-growing 
enforcement problem for the motion picture and television industries. 
My fifth and final point on enforcement is a focus on improving the existing 
treaty obligations.  We heard from Sam Ricketson and others about how difficult 
the Berne Convention revisions are, and that even so-called special agreements to 
Berne (such as the WCT and the WPPT) are nearly impossible to negotiate and 
adopt.  Remember, the digital treaties—the WCT and the WPP—are now over 
twenty years old, having been completed in December of 1996.11  So getting new 
multi-lateral agreements is a long, slow road to change. 
So what is the solution for improving treaty obligations?  The solution is not 
copyright treaty changes, but focusing on improving enforcement obligations in 
new Free Trade Agreements and regional trade agreements, where like-minded 
countries can get together and make some progress forward to address 
technological changes and other things that already exist in their national laws, or 
are close to being adopted in their national laws.  One example is the KORUS, the 
US-Korea FTA which was completed in 2012, and which is essentially the high 
watermark of protections at least for authors and producers at the moment.12  
Another avenue could have been the TPP, which as I mentioned, is carrying on 
now without the United States as a member, but with eleven other countries.  And, 
we will see what happens between the U.S., Mexico and Canada with the re-
negotiations of NAFTA and any new enforcement obligations in that agreement. 
Finally, in this regard, a word about diplomacy.  When all else fails—and no 
jokes with this administration, as there is not much to joke about—but diplomacy 
actually does work.  Here is the dynamic: much more can be accomplished if 
negotiations are limited to two countries trying to improve their trade relations – 
whether focusing on trade benefits or trade sanctions for inadequate copyright laws 
or enforcement regimes.  What will often result is one country will agree to 
improve its national laws to address changes sought by the other, in exchange for 
other trade benefits.  That is good diplomacy – building relationships.  Yet, when 
many countries try this same effort in multi-lateral negotiations, these efforts fail.  
It is just easier, to make changes bilaterally, on a law-by-law or practice basis to 
 
 11. Julie S. Sheinblatt, The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 536 (1998). 
 12.  Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, S. 
Kor.-U.S., June 30, 2007, 125 Stat. 428. 
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improve protection and enforcement for authors and producers, if countries do it 
directly, and use diplomacy to focus attention on specific problems. 
Thank you. 
  
